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INTELLECTUAL LIBERTY AND THE SCHOOLS
JOHN E. COONS*
The American constitutional order has sheltered a wide
range of conflicting policy. Its primary symbols are spacious
and accommodate a variety of interpretations. Still the temp-
tation persists to probe for a central animating theme. A case
sometimes is made for equality as the core' and another for
individual liberty.2 There are also religious constructions; the
Pilgrims saw America as the hope for a new Jerusalem, and
eschatology remains a national addiction, even when it as-
sumes the form of a civil religion that no pilgrim would rec-
ognize.8 By contrast, skeptics can plausibly hold that any ap-
* Professor of Law, University of California Berkeley. The author
thanks his colleagues Edward Rubin, Michael Smith, and Stephen
Sugarman for their helpful comments on the manuscript of this article.
1. A serious effort in this direction is J. R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF
EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1978). Pole's aspiration is, however, frus-
trated by the problem of giving equality a meaningful definition. J. RAWLS',
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), may be seen as broadly egalitarian (But see
infra, at p. 500). M. WALZFR, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM
AND EQUALITY (1983) is another prodigious effort to make sense of equality
as explanatory. See also Dworkin, What is Equality, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.,
(1981); A. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245 (1983). For the
view that equality is a mere truism see Westen, To Lure the Tarantula From
Its Hole: A Response, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1186 (1983) and the series of related
articles by Westen and his critics cited therein.
2. M. NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (1982); S. AR-
ONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING (1983);
Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV 175 (1982); Feinberg,
Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution? 48 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 445 (1983). There is, of course, an ocean of cognate litera-
ture. Indeed, as I suggest below, even much of the "egalitarian" scholar-
ship can be read as a type of argument for a form of individualism. This
includes JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, and, explicitly,
DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW (1982). Obviously
any historical focus on liberty must come to terms with slavery; but the
civil war amendments can be read as essentially libertarian. It remains un-
clear that the equal protection guarantee has anything to do with substan-
tive equality.
3. R. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF (1970), especially ch. 9, "Civil Religion
in America;" J. C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS (1960). The 1984
presidential campaign included sprightly exchanges on the meaning and
proximity of Armageddon. In some quarters the president was suspected of
an inappropriately scriptural attitude to the matter. This complaint was
taken seriously enough to rate a denial.
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parent drift is merely a vector of interest group purposes -
that there is neither soul nor center but only conflicting
parts; a version of this thesis would interpret our organic law
as a medium for the quick, the clever, and the rich.' And
those who think in terms of class view the whole structure as
a club to beat the workers.
It would be naive to suppose that any of our major insti-
tutions could be adequately explained by a single popular
value. Nevertheless, it might be an instructive exercise to
pretend so, and this is not beyond the imaginative capacity.
Without absurdity one could suppose the existence of an im-
plicit American consensus that has crystallized around some
particular ideal such as equality or material progress which is
conceived to explain our major institutions. To be sure the
number of values available for such an exercise is severely
limited, for to be instructive they must be empirically plausi-
ble; theocracy and pacifism might not qualify. But, with that
qualification, the comparison of a particular focussed ideal
with bureaucratic structures and social practice may teach us
something about the ideal, the institutions, and even our-
selves. To measure the church, work, childhood, business, or
the army against a single explanatory value is to parallel, at
least weakly, the scientific method. One observes the data to
see whether the particular hypothesis "saves the appear-
ances." For example, an economist tries to squeeze what is
known about the family into a paradigm of economic ration-
ality; eventually he may come to modify either the model or
the data, but so much the better for his understanding and
ours.'
4. The range of interest group analysts is described and criticized in
T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969).
5. W. N. GRUBS AND M. LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: How AMERI-
CANS FAIL THEIR CHILDREN (1982); S. BOWLES AND H. GiNrrs, SCHOOLING IN
CAPITALIST AMERICA (1976); THE PoLmCS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
(D. Kairys ed. 1982); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement 96 HARV. L.
REv. 563 (1983); Przeworski and Wallerstein, The Structure of Class Conflict
in Democratic Capitalist Societies, 76 AM. POL Sa. REv. 215 (1982). An argu-
ment could be made in Marxist terms that the right and capacity of the
rich to choose, when coupled with residential segregation, produces pre-
cisely what one should expect - segregation by class.
6. The Friedmans are a prominent example of the effort to use the
welfare of the family unit as proxy for the welfare of individual children.
M. AND R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1980), especially ch. 6, "What's
Wrong with Our Schools?" involves a non-sequitur, but perhaps that can
come clear only after the attempt has been made. It seems to me that
Marxism makes a similar mistake in seeing the family as an epiphenomenon
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This brief essay applies that familiar tactic of analysis to
the schools. In an informal and selective manner it looks at
the American system of education in the light of one assumed
version of the national purpose, asking to what extent that
purpose and this institution could be reconciled. A more am-
bitious and systematic evaluation of education would replicate
the process, setting the schools successively against competing
teleologies; it would describe a plausible working model of
American schools and then ask in order: Could such an insti-
tution be sensibly viewed as a conspiracy of the bourgeoisie;
as a transmitter of WASP culture and religion; as the wedge
for a national dream of equality; as the incubator of a ration-
alistic, scientific utopia? And so forth.
The device is limited in its uses. By its nature it cannot
demonstrate that an institution is in every respect in harmony
with some ideal; since the data can never be exhausted, the
positive hypothesis is beyond proof. It is not, however, be-
yond disproof. Sometimes it can be shown that an institution
is in some major respect incompatible with a particular value.
And the more instances of disharmony - and the greater
their individual moment - the more difficult will it be to
maintain an interpretation of that institution as salvific, egali-
tarian, progressive, hedonistic or what have you. Depending
upon one's own values and purposes that negative insight
may be advantageous, 7 and, in any case, it is clarifying.
I. AUTONOMY AS THE CORE
Here the school system will be set against an assumed
civic commitment to individual liberty. The justification for
this focus is the plausible priority of liberty in the American
polity and the settled habit of educational spokesmen and the
Supreme Court to associate the public school with that value.
In this society liberty has competition as an explanatory
value; nevertheless, it enjoys at least the degree of priority
required for the exercise here projected. It is "constitu-
tional" in the broad English sense of fundamental institutions
and understandings as well as in the narrower included do-
main of judicial review under the specific guarantees of our
of production. On this point see B. BERGER AND P. BERGER, THE WAR OVER
THE FAMILY (1983).
7. The effort to test the system against an idea of liberty is impor-
tant to one, like myself, committed to a high degree of family autonomy
and empowerment. My particular perspective of the present dispensation
of authority in education will be registered below.
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written constitution. In both senses the American idea em-
bodies a more or less coherent conception of the central
place of individual rights. An argument for a single dominat-
ing value - liberty or any other - could begin with the ob-
servation that, for a system so complex, dynamic and politi-
cal, it has maintained a remarkable consistency. The relevant
opinions of the Supreme Court seldom surprise;8 and the
normative symbols they invoke are generally common to ma-
jority and dissent. Indeed, whether in Court or legislature,
and amidst the sharpest conflict, most argument seems cut
from the same basic cloth.
Broadly speaking that cloth is the ideal of personal au-
tonomy. The centerpiece of domestic human rights is the
presumption, often explicit, that each of us can choose for
himself. Individual freedom to forge an identity is one main
theme of our common purpose whether it be expressed in
terms of speech, privacy, association, mobility or (even) prop-
erty. Under protection of organic law men and women may
travel at will and choose their religion and associations; they
may read, see or say basically what they choose for them-
selves. This commitment suffuses the full range of our gov-
ernmental structures and informs the content of law far be-
yond the perimeter of the relatively few court-declared
rights. This was so from the beginning. The major institu-
tions of American political life were fashioned as insurance
for dissenters. What Madison preached concerning the self-
canceling effect of private faction was embedded in the foun-
dation.' The mutual balancing of the powers of the national
government as well as the structure of federalism were instru-
ments to protect the individual will, and they continue to
serve that end, if imperfectly.
True, the autonomy theme has never been accepted in
the libertarian sense that less government always is better
government; as the history of economic and social regulation
attests, at no point has the Watchman State approached con-
stitutional status or consensus. Nonetheless, even the vexing
legal constraints of modern life can be interpreted less as a
limit upon autonomy than as its intended instrument. Every
reformer hopes to "liberate" the individual whether in the
role of consumer, voter, worker, woman, minority or student.
From the FCC to OSHA to affirmative action there continu-
8. 1 will concede that the abortion decisions, beginning with Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), have been exceptions.
9. THE FEDERALmST No. 51, at 339 (1. Madison) (ed. 1937).
[Vol. I
INTELLECTUAL LIBERTY
ally reemerges the theme that the maximizing of liberty en-
tails not the elimination but the artful tailoring of con-
straints. However one may assess the actual impact of all this
law, the promotion of autonomy has been regulation's most
prominent rationale. Such efforts to legislate liberty may in
many cases be self-defeating, but this does not necessarily al-
ter the centrality or sincerity of the objective.
This has been true even of the Supreme Court in its oc-
casional interventions on behalf of oppressed groups. When
it patches a rent in the social safety net, as in Plyler v. Doe,10
the court no doubt is moved by many concerns, not least of
which is the simple samaritan impulse to help the underdog.
And, of course, the Court may represent a multitude of other
values more or less distinct from liberty including federalism,
efficiency, liberal guilt and judicial restraint. But, at a deeper
level, it seeks the larger end of a "free society." Each of the
other aims, though explicitly normative, is in its relation to
liberty, instrumental. The teleology of judicial review re-
mains the preservation and extension of a system of individ-
ual autonomy. When the Court opens the schoolhouse door
to the children of illegal aliens, it expresses a conviction that,
for some, the safety net in its various forms is necessary to
the practical exercise of individual choice. Even the health,
education and welfare structure, including its constitutional
aspects, can be pictured as an instrument of liberty."
It is their sharing in this ideology that makes John Rawls,
Milton Friedman, Ronald Dworkin and Ronald Reagan intel-
lectual cousins. Their mutual wars are intense, as befits rela-
tives, but it really is all in the family. For their difference is
only about the proper means to deliver liberty and responsi-
bility to the individual. They can all claim to represent the
genus liberal. Even Dworkin's most energetic invocations of
equality often reduce to instrumental judgments about the
10. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The decision held that chil-
dren of illegally resident aliens were entitled to educational benefits on the
same terms as other children. The majority opinion is cast within a tradi-
tion now established for education cases. See Brown v. Board of Educ. 347
U.S. 483 (1954). The Court repeats an encomium to the public school in
terms of freedom and independence, advancement on the basis of individ-
ual merit and other aspects of self-determination.
11. The best exegesis of the theme that welfare rights may best be
understood as protected instruments of individual political rights is
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q.
659 (1979) and Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv L. RExv. 7 (1969).
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS &I PUBLIC POLICY
minimum conditions of autonomy.1" And while most com-
ment on Rawls concerns itself with the "difference princi-
ple," the primary maxim in his lexical scheme is grounded in
liberty.1' It is not clear how much credit should go to these
eighteenth and nineteenth century ideologies for the present
content of the ideal. The moral premise which most nearly
unites and typifies them is J. S. Mills' imperative -that no
description of the good may claim priority - that value must
remain in a matter of personal preference."' For contempo-
raries like Dworkin this continues to be expressed as an abso-
lute. 15 There is, to be sure, a problem here. Driven to its log-
ical boundaries dogmatic relativism may conflict with its own
common ideal of tolerance. A radical equality of values can-
not without contradiction give special place to anything
including liberty.1
Thus, it can be argued that our substantial liberty and its
supporting welfare structures persist not so much because of,
but in spite of, an allegiance to moral neutrality. The primacy
of the individual will could rather be an inheritance from
competing creeds holding that some choices are better than
others. Some have always supposed on religious or philosoph-
ical grounds that the fully human life consists in the free ex-
ercise of a capacity to choose or refuse some identifiable
good; and it is on this premise that they would support the
liberal state.1 7 Such an ethic demands opportunities suited to
12. E.g. -[E]conomic equality and the familiar individual rights stem
from the same fundamental conception of equality as independence."
Magee, interview with Dworkin, Three Concepts of Liberalism, 180 THE NEw
RFPUBLIC (No. 15) April 14, 1979 41, 47. See generally Dworkin, What is
Equality, 10 PHIL & PUB. AFF., Nos. 3 & 4 (1981).
13. See Rawls, supra note 1, at 60.
14. J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (McCallum ed. 1946).
15. For Dworkin it is "the basic liberal idea that justice must be inde-
pendent of any idea of human excellence or of the good life." Dworkin,
Three Concepts of Liberalism, supra note 12, at 48. John Wilson, in his Equal-
ity describes as a "liberal notion the idea that "[W]e are not entitled to
weigh the wills of other men by our own criteria at all." JOHN WILSON,
EQUALITY 129 (1966) and Bruce Ackerman adds that "No reason is a good
reason if it requires the power holder to assert . . . that his conception of
the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens" B. ACKER-
MAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11 (1980).
16. See Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REv.
247 (1983); Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, DUKE L. J. 1229
(1979).
17. W. LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1955); J. C. MURRAY, WE
HOLD THESE TRUTHS (1960); Declaration on Religious Freedom (December 7,
1965) and On the Development of Peoples (March 26, 1967) [both the latter
[Vol. I
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that capacity; the conditions of moral choice become the
foundation or tolerance. If virtue by its nature requires the
discretion to sin, a substantial liberty is its indispensable
instrument.
In any event, such contests over the intellectual pedigree
of liberty really only confirm a curiously stable agreement
among very diverse minds that - whatever in the end life
may be about - American government and society are about
the provision of the structural and material support for au-
tonomy. Or - for the last time - so it may plausibly be
argued. Liberty, then, is worth testing as the explanatory
value of our institutions, including the schools.
A. The Special Problem of Children's Liberty
A major difficulty in this enterprise is the meaning of lib-
erty in the context of childhood. In school, as in virtually all
aspects of life, children remain subject to adult rule to a fairly
advanced age, generally eighteen. This does not deny that
the child at an early age has a will - and often a reason -
as distinct and effective as that of an adult. Most adults agree
that children lead a moral life which is significant even if rel-
atively narrow in scope.1 8 And, as the child advances in com-
petence an understanding, the justification for limiting his
choices becomes progressively problematic. Nevertheless, a
general subordination to parents and/or bureaucrats en-
dures. What is its rationale? Confusion and ambivalence on
this issue are evident both in the social literature of child-
hood1" and in court opinions deciding whether to support the
are encyclicals of Vatican II signed by Paul VI].
18. The popular thesis of a "staged" morality hypothesized by Law-
rence Kohlberg (based on Piagetian psychology) may to a degree conflict
with this proposition; Kohlberg has committed himself to the gnostic posi-
tion that " . . . Virtue is knowledge of the good," and that "the. . . ethi-
cally higher must come later." L. KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL
DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE VOL. 1 (1981) at 189
and 131 respectively. See also ibid, pp. xxix, 30, 128, 134 184-7. I cannot
accept the view that unlettered and intuitive moral choices count less than
those of the moral savant; for me the "ethically higher" is a possibility for
all (including children of modest age and sophistication). Hence, while
Kohlberg's data are interesting for some purposes, I reject his thesis as I
interpret it.
19. The chaos in the rationalization of a liberty special to children
began at least as early as Herbert Spencer's chapter on The Rights of Chil-
dren in SOCIAL STATICS (1851). I recommend it as a hilarious example of
19th Century optimism. For cognate modern works of a more sober sort
see L. HOULGATE, THE CHILD AND THE STATE: A NORMATIVE THEORY OF Ju-
19851
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will of the child, the state or the parent regarding such mat-
ters as obscenity, 1 curfews," arm bands in the classroom,"
cosmetic surgery," abortion" and the selection of school li-
brary books.26 Why is the autonomy principle so murky in its
application even to relatively mature children?
One possible answer is that self-determination for chil-
dren is necessarily in conflict with the autonomy of supervis-
ing adults. It is unlikely that father and junior can both know
best; but it is certain that they cannot both rule. Yet, though
this is technically correct, it could mislead. In spite of formal
subordination, it may be that the child's autonomy can in
practice be consistent with the rule of adults; indeed, ex-
tending the point, it will be argued here that without an
adult regime the younger child's liberty can scarcely be
imagined.'7 If the experience of autonomy is to be available
to a child, adult authority must be its instrument, for a child's
freedom to choose at all depends upon protections and
limits.28
Analysis here can start with the political reality that chil-
dren will be formally subject to the discretion of some partic-
ular adult or set of adults. This adult regime will be arranged
in the name of child protection, children's liberty, parental
liberty, or the interests of third persons - or all four. A par-
ent or a public bureaucracy, or some combination of both,
will hold the legal authority to direct his comings and goings
VENILE RIGHTS (1980); C. L.AscH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD. THE FAM-
ILY BESIEGED (1977); F. ZIMRiNG, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADoLES-
CENCE (1982). In my judgment none of these effectively analyzes the
complex interrelation of the respective liberty interests of parent and child.
20. The most comprehensive collection of the cases is R. MNOOKIN,
CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE, (1978).
21. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See also New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
22. People v. Chambers, 66 II1. 2d 36, 360 N.E. 2d 55 (1976).
23. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
24. Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E. 2d 25 (1956).
25. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398 (1981).
26. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
27. For a romantic example of the problem see W. GOLDING, LORD OF
THE FLIES (1964); for a possible counter-example see RICHARD HUGHES, A
HIGH WIND IN JAMAICA (1929).
28. The argument that follows here is presented in a different form
and at length in J. COONS AND S. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE
CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL (1978). See also, Coons, Law and the Sovereigns of
Childhood, 58 PHi DELTA KAPPAN 19 (1976).
[Vol. I
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until some age. If eighteen is the wrong age, make it fifteen
- or twenty-one. The principle remains the same. Universal
liberation for children in the sense of formal legal autonomy
is a non-idea. The only real question here is by what rationale
and under what structures should legal authority over the
child be parceled out between parent, state, and the child
himself if liberty - as opposed to other possible values - is
to remain primary?
This inescapable limit on children's freedom is not
merely an artifact of politics. It is a fact of nature. Even if
one held liberty to be the sole concern, there would remain a
practical, insuperable and permanent obstacle to liberation.
Children are small, weak, and inexperienced; adults are big,
strong and initiated. One may liberate children from the law
of man, but the law of nature is beyond repeal. There is no
way to send an eight-year-old out of the sovereignty of the
family and into a world of liberty. For he will there be intro-
duced to a new sovereignty of one kind or another. It may be
a regime of want, ignorance, and general oppression; it may
be one of delightful gratification. The ringmaster could be
Fagin or Mary Poppins. Whatever the reality, it will be cre-
ated by people with more power and by the elements. Chil-
dren - at lest small children - will not be liberated; 'they
will be dominated. And none of this can be altered by provid-
ing "open schools" an permissive child rearing. These are
merely indulgences granted by and within the dominion of
adults who meanwhile stand ready forcibly to rescue the
child, even against his will, from nature, hostile adults, and
the child's own mistakes.
This is true even of mature teenagers who might have a
ripened capacity for autonomy or at least for autonomy in
regard to specific activities such as driving. Until formal
emancipation these persons will be subject to general-purpose
adult regimes either of the state, the family or both. And
while particular rights of a child to drive, travel or choose a
religion could theoretically be recognized by law, the overall
adult regime will retain very significant reins through its con-
trol of the purse and its other general powers. The state
might decide to allow every child of fifteen to choose his
school; nevertheless, so long as parents can retaliate by with-
holding the car, the allowance, new clothes and other privi-
leges, the child's so-called right loses much of its substance.
But consider the other side: Despite this inevitability of
adult dominion, a de facto liberty for children is not a self
contradiction. The child's strong and important interest in
19851
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liberty can indeed be a favored object of policy. It can be
pursued precisely by securing his legal subordination to the
particular adult regime that most respects that interest. A
child subject to adult authority will in practice be allowed his
own choice in varying doses; these will depend upon what the
particular authority thinks appropriate. The relevant ques-
tion then becomes, which regime is the likelier source of such
practical autonomy? There are two candidates: On the one
hand stands the parent or parent substitute; on the other,
some agency of the state. And, of course, authority may be
parcelled between them in countless ways. This is an oversim-
plification, but it is a place to start.
Now let us raise slightly the level of complexity. Obvi-
ously the child has not merely a liberty interest but what can
fairly be labeled a "welfare" interest; this is composed of
physical safety, normal growth, affection, education and the
like. His liberty interest - our special focus here - is re-
lated to but quite different from the welfare interest. Its core
is the religious-philosophic premise that children, like adults,
have wills and make choices. In this capacity for choice lies
the child's claim to be part of the moral community. Ideally
the choices of a child display an advancing rationality and vir-
tue; but, in any case, choice has an absolute value for him just
as it has for adults. However, unlike adults, in the case of
children the liberty interest often must be subordinated to
the welfare interest; otherwise little Lucy will not survive -
or at least not develop - so as to exercise her full potential
for autonomy. Children can make choices that society deems
too costly both to the child's welfare interest and to his ex-
panding capacity for choice. We want the adult free to decide
whether to stay up late; hence we curfew the child.
Insofar as one wished to maximize children's liberty, the
trick would be to find that special adult regime which would
make the daily selections between yea and nay with sensitivity
to the child's interest in choice here and now but with equal
concern for his growing capacity for self-determination. Em-
ploying these criteria an ideal regime would decide when self-
direction by the child is desirable and when it is not. It may
be beneficial or baneful today for Lucy to be allowed to
choose for herself whether to read or go to the movies; it
may be wise or foolish to give her the choice to attend either
school A or School B. In which adult shall we lodge the au-
thority to decide whether Lucy may decide for herself? And
in those cases where choice is to be denied her, who shall
then decide the substantive issue?
[Vol. I
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This last question is not exclusively about liberty; for it
does not arise until it has already been determined that the
child shall not make the decision. It could be decided, for
example, that ten-year-olds shall not be free to consent to
surgery; which adult shall then consent or refuse - the state
or the parent or both in some combination? The focus here
seems to be welfare. Nevertheless, the question remains at
least partly about the child's liberty. For, though the child's
own preference in the matter cannot be decisive, it may be
relevant to the correctness of the decision judged in terms
either of liberty or welfare. Thus which regime has the most
effective access to his views and can give them proper weight
is often an important liberty issue. In truth, decisions about a
child's welfare so implicate the child's interest in autonomy
that there would be something eccentric about any theory
that simply divorced the two. Nevertheless, the primary con-
cern in this essay justifies a somewhat lopsided emphasis upon
liberty.
It is now necessary to consider some criteria by which to
evaluate the two adult regimes that compete for authority.
The questions are who shall determine whether the child is
to choose or be chosen for, and, if the latter, who shall de-
cide? On the one hand stands the state operating through its
professionalized agencies; on the other stands the family com-
posed ambiguously of at least two, and usually more, human
wills. Would there be a preferred way to approach the alloca-
tion of authority over these issues, if the object were to en-
hance liberty?
B. Parental Representation of the Child's Liberty Interest
Let us begin with a reservation. Since the child's welfare
interest must be respected (even in the name of liberty), it is
silly to suppose that the state should simply remain inert in
the face of grave risk to the child. When the chips are down,
few would abandon the child to a sadistic or wholly neglectful
parent. The state may not be much good at setting minimum
standards of protection, but it is all we have, unless we are to
invite vigilante enforcement of child protection. Throughout
I shall assume that such a need for minimum protection
would apply to formal education. One can respect those who
oppose compulsory education, but it is not clear that liberty is
advanced by allowing families to leave their offspring in igno-
rance. In any case, to concede the necessity for some mini-
mum standard of educational protection would settle nothing
19851
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about the allocation of authority over the form that educa-
tion should take. It would only bring us to the question of
who best should decide how the minimum in education (as in
anything else) is to be satisfied and what should happen be-
yond the minimum.
Intuitively one may be inclined to assume that in educa-
tion or any other matter an adult who knows the individual
child will be the best judge both of the child's readiness for
autonomy in any particular matter, and - where rejecting
autonomy - of the "correct" answer to be imposed. If this
intuition is sound, it is a reason to lodge primary control in
the parents through legal presumptions in their favor. But it
could be wrong and surely would be wrong in individual in-
stances. At best it wants justification as a general proposition.
There are at least four reasons to expect parental pri-
macy to be in general the most effective agent of liberty.
Three concern promotion of the child's own liberty and will
be described briefly in this section. The fourth is grounded in
the liberty of the parent and is considered thereafter. At the
risk of being tiresome I shall state now and repeat that these
speculations and assertions are based principally upon per-
sonal observation through twenty-five years of watching
schools and families and raising more than my quota of the
world's progeny. There is no social science bearing directly
on this issue.'
Regarding the liberty of the child it should be observed
first, that the normal parent has a selfish interest in the
child's becoming independent. Few adults want their children
to be permanent moral and economic burdens. Parents suffer
when the child's autonomy suffers; what is good for the
child's liberty tends to be good for parents and vice versa.
This conclusion, of course, is not a logical necessity, nor
could it be proved by experiment; without self-contradiction
one could imagine that most parents prefer that their off-
spring remain moral puppets and economic parasites. Doubt-
less some do want just that for reasons that, long before
29. There is, of course, an ocean of literature on the family and bu-
reaucracy but there seems to be none that directly responds empirically or
even with serious analysis to the peculiar question of proxy liberty for the
child. Part of the problem is the absence of common definitions for basic
terms such as autonomy. See, infra, pp. 521-522. Two very thoughtful phil-
osophical and relevant analyses of parental rights and duties are Bridges,
Non-paternalistic Arguments in Support of Parents' Rights, 18 J. OF PHIL OF
EDuQ. 55 (1984); and Gutmann, Children, Paternalism, and Education, 9
PHIL AND PuB. AFF. 338 (1980). See also the works cited in note 19.
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Freud, the mass of mankind recognized as pathetic and path-
ological. It is the stuff of sad novels about the high
bourgeoisie.
But that is the point; such motivation is not a normality.
Emphatically it is not the stuff of ordinary families where
adults work for a living and expect their children to do like-
wise. For them such an attitude constitutes moral and eco-
nomic insanity. Quite evidently most parents feel that they
prosper by making decisions that enhance their child's auton-
omy, and they suffer from those that create dependency.
Professionally bureaucrats may also in most instances
work for the child's autonomy. If so, this is to their credit,
for often they have a strong objective interest in maintaining
dominance over the child and family; the less the child ad-
vances, the more the professional is needed. While one can
admire professional restraint where it occurs, the question
nonetheless would remain whether the best strategy is to en-
trust the fostering of the child's liberty to the altruism of ex-
perts. Of course, the danger to liberty from professional
domination arises chiefly in situations where the client is cap-
tive; when, by contrast, the family is free to "'exit,'80 eco-
nomic incentives can help to unite the self-interest of the pro-
fessional to that of the child. Later we shall have to assess the
degree of liberty typical of the relation between professional
and client in the schools.
Accountability for decisions may increase the adult de-
cider's interest in the child's advancement to autonomy; but
it does not follow necessarily that the accountable adult is the
decider. Conceivably he could be accountable but ineffective.
On that issue one has nothing, again, but experience and
sense as a guide. Mine suggest that having a stake in the out-
come provides a healthy discipline for the decider. Further-
more, if I am deceived - if the best decider is disinterested
- we will have introduced a grave difficulty. Applied to
adults the same conclusion would disable anyone from decid-
ing for himself; for, in the adult the two roles of subject and
decision maker merge producing the ultimate in accountabil-
ity for mistakes. A preference for the disinterested decider
would become a premise for universal dependency.
The second argument for parental choice is that parents
care most about the child and that caring promotes decisions
30. The quotation marks signal the familiar and well-regarded work
of ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLNE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS. AND STATES (1970).
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that advance his autonomy. Caring is cousin to accountability
but there is a real difference. The distinction is one of altru-
ism - or, more properly - love. Caring denotes not self-
interest but disinterest coupled with an affection focussed
upon a particular child. Such a focus is normal to the family
and uncharacteristic, or even improper, to the professions.
There will no doubt be instances in which accountability
and caring will conflict. The support of and special care for a
retarded or mentally ill child, for example, is seldom in an
adult's self-interest; this is especially true when the harassed
parent is offered the opportunity to pack the child away in a
state institution. 1 Love, of course, may persist where interest
fails, and heroism is common in the parental role. But
whether or not love prevails over interest, it must in every
case be accounted a benefit to the child in the decision pro-
cess. And the normal case in which both love and self-interest
are allied in the deciding parent must be accounted the ideal.
Still there remains the question whether parental love
seeks autonomy as a specific good. To the extent that paren-
tal love is conceived as a kind of narcissism, one could be led
to expect conflict and ambivalence regarding the child's au-
tonomy. On this issue one consults his encounters with peo-
ple who are parents and with the central traditions of our
culture. At least the latter - and for me the former as well
- hold that generally the relation is not only profoundly un-
selfish but provides the principal, if imperfect, model of self-
lessness;u that we are our own children's keeper is acknowl-
edged even by egotists who regard brotherhood as a canard.
31. The problem is dramatically represented by Parham v.J. R., 422
U.S. 584 (1979). And see In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286,
141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977). The saddest example I know is recounted in
Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 188, Cal. Rptr. 781 (App. 1983). A retarded
fourteen-year-old boy placed in a state institution by his parents needed
heart surgery. The parents resisted, apparently on the paradoxical ground
that they feared for the child's welfare if he outlived them. The court ap-
proved a guardianship petition and ordered the operation.
32. David Bridges strikes about the right note:
• . . human love or altruism is rarely perfect and rarely untinged by
self-interest or by that complexity of motives which arises when
one finds pleasure or joy in giving to others. An account of famil-
ial relationships which is devoid of reference to love seems to me
to be an impoverished one; but an account which fails to recognize
that they also involve a distribution of power is unrealistic. The
relationship between love and power in the family is perhaps bet-
ter the subject of the literary than the philosophical imagination.
D. Bridges, supra, note 29, at 60.
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And, if one accepts this picture as reality, it is also easy to
believe that the autonomy of the child is a primary parental
object. For to love selflessly is by definition to love one who is
distinctly other; perhaps, indeed, the more distinct the other
becomes, the richer the possibility for loving him. It may take
Albert Schweizer to love Mankind, but a mere mother could
love Lucy. And the more the child becomes Lucy, the more
her mother loves her.
But let us lean over backwards: The very intensity of the
relation could be thought problematic. Parental fervor could
get in the way of good judgment about the proper means to
secure autonomy. This too seems plausible and is confirmed
intermittently, especially in medical decision making. On rare
occasions parents seem misled by their very concern into neu-
rotic and bizarre decisions. Surely, however, these are the ex-
ceptions proving the rule that parental caring, on the whole,
supports autonomy. Equally important, these aberrations are
precisely the kind of behavior which minimum standards of
protection are designed to prevent.
The third premise is simply that the parent's knowledge
of what will nourish autonomy will in general be superior to
that of the bureaucratic decision maker, at least for purposes
of reaching decision in difficult cases. This is probable for
two reasons. The first is that the parent has special access to
the child's own view of things. For obvious reasons the child's
voice is difficult to hear in large institutions; indeed, outside
the home many youngsters respond to crises in their school
or day care experience with a silent passivity that masks the
problem and discourages adult inquiry. By contrast the inti-
macy of the family maximizes the child's own power to move
adults to do his will. In the normal family even the silence of
a child is a strong form of communication. Whatever the
family is, it is a debating society, and the child's voice is diffi-
cult to exclude.
The parents' knowledge is thereby enhanced in ways
closed to an alien professional. Doubtless the professionals'
own knowledge is in certain dimensions wholly superior. He
"knows" about children in general - the pathologies that
sometimes bind them and the therapies that can loose them.
There are unfortunately narrow limits to this kind of science
and striking dissensus among the professionals. Still no one
doubts its potential importance. Insofar as this kind of knowl-
edge is reliable, however, its conclusion can usually be shared
effectively with parents in various ways during the decision
making process whether the subject be medicine, discipline
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or education. The parents knowledge, by contrast, is less sub-
ject to communication; it is too immediate, too immanent. It
is often literally unspeakable. It follows, curiously, that in an
important sense parents can be the more knowledgeable de-
ciders, for they can combine the conclusions of the profes-
sional with their own incommunicable insights. This, of
course, assumes a relation in which parents not only control
the final decision but have access to professionals (of varying
opinions).
The import of these first three considerations - self-in-
terest, caring and knowledge - is that the family (almost
without regard to its lifestyle) tends to be the right environ-
ment for the child's gradual transition from a dependent and
dominated infancy to an adolescence marked by an ever in-
creasing practical liberty bestowed by parents. In the run of
families the child achieves formal autonomy at eighteen al-
most without a ripple. Granted, the pilgrimage through ado-
lescence is seldom negotiated without pain; the family, never-
theless, represents the best odds for "breaking away" with
one's soul intact. Were it a most miserable institution, the
family might in relative terms represent the efficient medium
of liberty."
Again, the parental primacy is limited. It can not pre-
empt the duty of the state, where necessary, to intervene to
protect the child's health and safety and, thereby, indirectly,
to support his liberty. To that end the state imposes its mini-
mum standards; but their application is triggered only by
demonstrated and basic family failure. To justify intervention
government historically has been required to overcome a
strong presumption favoring parental authority. Quite plausi-
bly this policy may rest on the conviction that constant or un-
predictable intrusion into the family would poison the source
of the very liberty of the child that the state is trying to
protect.
C. Parental Liberty
The fourth justification for familial authority is the par-
ent's own liberty interest. Presumably it is equal in political
dignity to that of the child. In terms of autonomy there is a
33. The contrary position is asserted in B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE
IN THE LIBERAL STATE 139-167 (1980). The parental role is viewed as fre-
quently hostile to autonomy, at least by comparison to the role of the lib-
eral state as Ackerman would define it. See discussion, infra, pp. 518-521.
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great deal at stake here for the parent." The right to form
families and to determine the scope of their children's practi-
cal liberty is for most men and women the primary occasion
for choice and responsibility. One does not have to be rich or
well placed to experience the family. The opportunity over a
span of fifteen or twenty years to attempt the transmission of
one's own deepest values to a beloved child provides a unique
arena for the creative impulse. Here is the communication of
ideas in its most elemental mode. Parental expression, for all
its invisibility to the media, is an activity with profound First
Amendment implications. Nor, of course, is parental expres-
sion lacking in legal protection; indeed, fathers and mothers
may be the only speakers with an enforceable claim to an au-
dience. At the same time the intimacy of the family ensures
that the child enjoys a reciprocal advantage in the practical if
not in the legal order; in matters that concern him, he can
expect a hearing for his own view.
The implications of all this remain to be captured in
First Amendment doctrine. For understandable reasons polit-
ical and legal theories of free expression have been preoccu-
pied with public expression. But it is no exaggeration to say
that intellectual liberty has a primary locus in the family and
that the heart of the forum is the home.
Indeed, even as we view the parental primacy in its tradi-
tional forms, it emerges as a source of intellectual, social and
political liberty both for child and parent. It is in the name of
liberty that the legal system blesses child rearing practices
that range far from the norm. Parents can allow children to
make dangerous air trips, stay up late, drink wine, work at
various employments otherwise forbidden and pursue exotic
religious and political beliefs.3 So long as they feed and
clothe them and keep them in school and out of the hospital,
the constitution generally protects the parental judgment
even where it is manifested in a broad permissiveness.
34. Though his own concern is broader, David Bridges' view of the
parental interest is certainly relevant to the liberty element:
. . . though this sort of parental authority is commonly justified in
terms of what is in children's interest (i.e. paternalistically) it is
quite reasonably and more convincingly justified in terms of ma-
ture judgement as to what is a fair balance of the interests of
adults and children (i.e. to some extent non-paternalistically). In
short, parents have the right to protect themselves from what
could be the overwhelming egocentrism of children. D. Bridges,
supra, note 29, at 58.
35. See cases collected in Mnookin, supra note 20, at 277-341.
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There are exceptions. Prince v. Massachusetts" allowed
the state to limit the dispensing authority of parents whose
children wished to join them in selling religious tracts on the
street. But, Prince is aging and lonesome. The authority of its
5-4 majority is enfeebled by the variety of recent opinions le-
gitimating very marginal parenting practices and also by a
general reform of custody law that has narrowed the state's
capacity to interfere with the family. Of course the picture is
complicated by counter currents such as separate age-based
standards for purchase of sexually explicit materials and by
statutes directed at the "kiddie-porn" industry. The latter
statutes upheld in New York v. Ferber 7 are clearly a (sensible)
restraint upon the liberty of both parent and child. The
state's purpose was wholly to eliminate practices which it
deemed to constitute child abuse. They were below the "min-
imum;" even parents cannot allow them.
On the other hand superficially similar laws regulating
purchase by children of certain reading material suggest a
rather different kind of legislative purpose, one consistent
with one version of parental liberty. Statutes barring the sale
of sexually explicit materials to younger children are a good
example; in Ginsberg v. New York" these were upheld against
First Amendment attack. But while Ginsberg does limit the
child's right to secure these materials on his own, it suggests
no limit upon the parental liberty to decide whether they
shall nonetheless be made available to the child. Indeed,
Ginsberg can be interpreted as a legislative effort to support
parental discretion against the invasion of external forces of
the media that would frustrate the parents' will in the practi-
cal order. Given a parental authority to license the child's
reading of particular books - or to bestow upon him full
discretion - it is hard to paint cases like Ginsberg simply as a
restraint. In any case the central point remains: The parental
liberty weighs in the accounting.
It would be fair to observe that, in declaring parental au-
thority over children to be a form of liberty, I have defined
every legal constraint upon parents (including compulsory ed-
ucation) as a liberty lost; the same is true for every legal au-
tonomy bestowed upon children, such as a right to contracep-
tives.8' In a polity devoted exclusively to parental liberty this
36. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
37. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
38. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
39. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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line of thought would lead inexorably to the paterfamilias.
Had that been my intention, I should not have emphasized
the contribution of parental primacy to children's liberty.
Still the many conflicts between the liberty of parent and
child are inevitable and obvious, and there is no reason that
all of them be resolved in favor of the adults. More to the
point, they are not to be resolved at all in the sense that there
is some decisive calculus of net liberty. No division of power
will ever be authoritative. For sanity in policy making it is
enough that society appreciate both the ordinary harmony as
well as the respective importance of the distinctive liberty in-
terests of parent and child. This harmony is quite sufficient to
explain most of the traditional law of childhood in terms that
are consistent with liberty. However - and we come at last
to the point - it is no assistance in explaining the American
system of education.
II. THE EDUCATIONAL EXCEPTION TO PARENTAL LIBERTY
Since Meyer v. Nebraska"° and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,4" it
has commonly been supposed that, above some reasonable
minimum set by the state, the liberty interest in education is
secure. The reality is more complex and constraining. The
congeries of structures legislated to deliver education forces
most children into state schools whatever their wishes or
their parents. To put it briefly: schooling is compulsory; a
state-operated school is available at no tuition; content and
method in such schools are settled by majoritarian politics;
and assignments are made on impersonal grounds by agents
of the state. In such a regime, those with means buy their
liberty by residing in their preferred attendance zone or by
paying tuition to attend a private school. For the rest the
school is selected by compulsion.""
This embarrassment to liberty in the "public"schools can
be accounted for in historical and even pseudo-libertarian
terms. It derives from basic attitudes of the patrician foun-
ders of the system. Even today their outlook appears essen-
tially benign. Granted, they paternalized the ordinary family
40. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
41. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
42. That the ordinary family experiences the public school assign-
ment as coercive is plain from its expressed desire to exist. See Gallup Poll
figures cited in note 87 infra. See generally Coons, Making Schools Public, in
E. Gaffney (ed.), PRIVATE SCHoOLS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD, PouC ALTERNA-
TIVE FOR THE EIGHTIES (1981).
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in ways that now would seem offensive. They nevertheless
viewed themselves as pursuing liberty in ways that may have
seemed plausible to the nineteenth century. They imagined
that education would in due course become a science; that
there was "one best way;" that it would be found; and that
any rational person would freely choose it.43 Compulsion was
necessary pro tem only for the barbarian fringe of society.
Further, they felt honestly - if paradoxically - that imposi-
tion of mainline Yankee culture was the best assurance of a
free society. In applying these assumptions the schools were
often abetted by their wards. Many immigrants were content
to be paternalized in the sense of being assimilated to the
mainstream culture. Having their children forced to learn
English was seldom perceived as oppression. No doubt the
teaching of majoritarian religion in the public schools was an-
other mater, being in many cases odious to dissenters; but va-
rious compromises on this issue kept the bondage tolerable.
Both justifications have long since evaporated. Only com-
puter salesmen can still believe that education will become a
science like physics or even like economics. The competing
medicines for the learning disease are too many to sustain the
view that professionals can tell which style and which school
is best for the individual child - except in very unusual
cases. And as for cultural unity, Americans have long since
concluded that there are many models of the good life. David
Bridges puts puts it well:
It is precisely because individuals and factions in society dif-
fer in their views about what is in the interests of children
individually and collectively that the question of political
rights of determination becomes significant. Nor is the 'lib-
eral' or 'neutral' alternative, of presenting the alternative
conceptions of the good life to children so that they can
choose, an entirely satisfactory answer to the problem. For
this is precisely one of the versions of what is good for chil-
dren which may be and indeed is in practice fiercely chal-
lenged... In short, the division of opinion among the adult
community as to what is in fact good for children under-
mines their claims to paternalistic intervention in children's
liberty in the name of such good."
The short of it is that the original justifications for a mo-
43. See generally, D. TYACi. THE ONE BEST SYSTEM, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION (1974).
44. D. Bridges, supra note 29, at 56.
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nopoly school system in a free society have become wholly
discredited.
This leaves the system standing as a great puzzle - at
best an anachronism - in a constitutional order that values
liberty. From top to bottom its structure effectively frustrates
the choices of parent and child which the law protects in
every other realm of life. Parents choose shoes, food, games,
hours and every other important feature of a child's life. In
education this liberty is not only opposed but squelched. Or-
dinary families with all their rich variety in culture and values
are forced to accept the form, content and ideology of a po-
litically dictated education.4 5 Public schools, as presently or-
ganized, chill the traffic in ideas that is generated by free
family choices in every other area of life. Though they vest in
the mantle of freedom and diversity, in fact they flout this
deepest purpose of the First Amendment.
The process of ideological inculcation for the non-rich
begins at the textbook publisher's house. Large school sys-
tems can and do compel millions of children to come and to
read what has been chosen for them by strangers. It is the
understandable desire of publishers to please such decision
makers. Upon close examination, these turn out to be not
only elective and appointed boards at various levels but a
whirling circle of intellectual lobbyists. As Mike Bowler
reports:
The publishers cannot survive if their books are not chosen
... . The pressures appear to be more intense than they
ever were, and they come from any number of sources on
both the "left" and the "right." There are NOW and the
Creationists, whose interests are 180 degrees in opposi-
tion. .... There are the unions and the right-to-work peo-
ple, those who would rid the books of racial stereotypes,
those who would give Indians, Chicanos and Arabs ...
their rightful place. There are the farmers and the meat-
packers. There are the urbanists and the ruralists, both op-
posed to the white picket fences of Dick and Jane. There
are the overlapping "back-to-basics" folks promoting pure
phonics and the old math, and there are those who see the
federal government as the only hope for bringing imagina-
45. Respecting the intellectual quality of the coming generation of
teachers see Weaver, In Search of Quality: The Need for Talent in Teaching, 61
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 29. See generally E. FmSmrxrzsii, THE CONDITION OF
TEACHING (Report to the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching) (1983).
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS &I PUBLIC POLICY
tive and effective curriculum to American children ...
[Tihe industry, already a conservative one, is becoming
even more conservative.4
6
The pressures are not exclusively of this informal sort.
Many state codes mandate that the curriculum emphasize the
contributions of various interest groups-minority and other-
wise.17 Some states have distributed to all teachers prescrip-
tive statements of the content and method for teaching
morals.48 The impact of such official grunts in the classroom
may be problematic; but majority sentiment expressed in
school board elections and in organized or disorganized pro-
test often do have consequence. Likewise, teacher unions
strongly influence the character of the institutions. Much can
still depend upon the private preferences and behavior of the
assigned teacher,"' but tenure and credentialing systems tend
even further to homogenize the teaching corps. The drift
overall is unmistakable; the system is tuned to keep the mes-
sage mellow. The vectored pressures of interest politics crush
the sharp edges of ideas and work to make school the instru-
ment of a smoothly textured ideology. There are exceptions.
One occurs where like-minded ideologues capture a school
board and dictate the school's mission. Another arises where
the school board and administration are indifferent; for in
that event the individual teacher can effectively become the
master of the students in his hands. But these would hardly
be exceptions which would enhance the liberty of parents
46. M. Bowler, quoted in Monthly Memo of the Institute for Educational
Leadership, (No. 25), October 1976, p. 7. The most comprehensive and
scholarly treatment of the current upset over book selection for schools
and libraries is R. O'NEIL, CLASSROOMS IN THE CROSSFIRE (1981). See also J.
BRYSON AND E. DETrY, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF CENSORSHIP OF PUBLIC SCHOOL
LIBRARY AND INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS (1982); Nocera, The Big Book-Ban-
ning Brawl, THE NEW REPUBLIC (September 13, 1982), p. 20. Perhaps the
most poignant tale of conflict involves traditional families of West Virginia
arrayed against school professionals and their literary preferences. Inquiry
Report: Kanawah County, West Virginia: A Textbook Study in Cultural Conflict,
(Washington, D.C.. National Education Association, 1975). Though the
study is partisan, it well portrays the inevitability of value coercion in the
present school system. For an insightful "inside" view of the pressures con-
stricting teachers in American high schools see T. SIzER, HORACE'S COMPRO-
MISE, THE DILEMMA OF THE AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL, (1984).
47. See Shelton, Legislative Control Over Public School Curriculum, 15
WILLIAMETrE L. REv 473 (1979).
48. Id. at 486-88.
49. See Sizer, supra note 46, at 210.
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and children"0 - certainly not of those who cannot afford to
move or pay tuition.
The decisions about style and content thus are made by
strangers and imposed. Any hope for redress at the school
board elections is reserved tor those enjoying leisure time; in
larger cities like New York or Los Angeles that hope is fatu-
ous. In any event, if you wind up in the minority, you lose.
Of course, no one can specify the precise effects of monop-
oly. Maybe some children learn better under a fully coercive
regime. And, no doubt, some ill-considered decisions by par-
ents are avoided. In this respect the system - despite its
anomic pattern - has some of the advantages of any intellec-
tual paternalism. It is, however, hard to defend as a contribu-
tion to liberty.
A. The Deliverance Defense
That defense nevertheless is sometimes attempted in
terms that have yet to be considered in this essay. The argu-
ment I have in mind must be treated with respect, for it is
made with sincerity by intelligent persons. It commences with
faith in the possibility of a "neutral" education that would
help to produce adults of a sturdy independence of mind and
spirit. This education is thought to represent the child's best
chance for deliverance from the prejudice of family and for
an introduction to the sunlight of an adult autonomy. There
are many variations of this professional vision. Among
schoolmen it has the properties almost of a folk legend that is
passed across generations. In his criticism of the opinion in
the 1968 armband case Professor Robert Burt expresses the
core of the tradition:
The Tinker Court erred not in its result, but in its fail-
ure to acknowledge the potential educational and constitu-
50. See generally O'NIL, CLASSROOMS IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra, note
46. If each public schoolroom could in practice represent a true market-
place of ideas, the First Amendment criticism of the system might be
blunted. The contribution of family-chosen expression would in that case
remain frustrated by coercive assignment but, if each child experienced the
marketplace in his own education, arguably this could match in its benign
effects the different kind of marketplace that would emerge in a system of,
family-chosen schools each with its specific style and message. Realistically,
however, only under special conditions can public schools become anything
approaching a neutral broker of ideas. Further, at least in an era of mass
media, it is the ideologically distinctive school that is most likely to contrib-
ute to the system of liberty. Of course, this holds only if it is freely chosen.
See discussion, infra, pp. 519-521.
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tional relevance of the facts in the case suggesting that the
children's armbands reflected more their parents' convic-
tions than theirs. The Court ignored the possibility that
school officials might exclude parental political views from
school in order to free children to think through these
questions themselves. As noted, that motivation was implau-
sible on the face of the Tinker record, but it is not an im-
plausible educational goal, nor should that goal be prohib-
ited by the Constitution. The Tinker Court should have
acknowledged that the constitutional question would have
changed complexion if the school officials had convincingly
argued that they were acting not to impose their political
views on students, but rather on behalf of the root values of
the first amendment - tolerance, diversity of thought, in-
dividual autonomy - against parental impositions on
children. 61
Here are the public schools in the role of liberator, a role
fully alternative and candidly competitive to the claims I have
made for parents. In the deliverance legend the public system
becomes the quintessential hope for a place where "parental
impositions" are excluded and children "think for them-
selves," developing thereby a commitment to first amend-
ment ideals.
The theme is developed at greater length in the dia-
logues of Bruce Ackerman in his Social Justice in the Liberal
State.5 chapter on "Liberal Education" explains his view
that, in the name of the liberal vision, parents should be es-
topped from taking unfair advantage of teenage minds. It
may be necessary to allow parents to push their eccentricities
on young children, but high school is the place where the
liberal state must compel (as it were) a free dialogue. The
correct curriculum will be one that is neutral in the sense
that all possible views will be represented fairly. Students will
decide for themselves what they believe, and they will be-
come truly effective in the arts of self-determination by living
through the experience of the "neutral dialogue." Acker-
man's mythic liberal educator puts it this way:
51. Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights of, in, and for Children, 39 L.
& CoNTEpoRy PROBLEMS. No. 3 118 (1975) at p. 124. And see generally
Gutmann, Children, Paternalism and Education, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. (1980);
Bridges, Non-paternalistic Arguments in Support of Parents' Rights, 18 J. OF
PHIL OF EDUC. 55 (1984).
52. B. ACKERMAN. SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
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In exercising my power over the young, I have not used it
to indoctrinate them into one or another of the competing
ideals affirmed by members of our political community. In
my capacity as liberal educator, I do not say that any of
these ideals is worthy of greater respect than any other. In-
stead, my aim has been to provide each child with those cul-
tural materials that-given his imperfect self-control and
inexperience- he would find most useful in his efforts at
self-definition. After all, these children are citizens of our
liberal state. Although they may be subjected to special lim-
itations when necessary to assure their future standing as
citizens, they may not otherwise be denied their right to
pursue their good in the way they think best."
Later in the book Ackerman's deference to the child's
own will becomes more attenuated. He acknowledges that
"The task is not to undertake a vain search for the coercion-
free educational system, but to consider ways in which the
inevitably coercive aspects of socialization can be justified.
'""5
He concedes that what liberals are searching for is ". . . a
theory that will enable decision makers to legitimize their
uses of power without claiming the right to declare that one
conception of the good is better than another.""
In these passages and elsewhere Burt and Ackerman
faithfully reproduce the ambivalence of the "neutral" educa-
tor who is so opposed to forcing students' minds that he com-
pels them to hear what he thinks will free them. Too liberal
to impose on anyone, he imposes on everyone. This paradox-
ical outlook allows its spokesmen to remain ambiguous as to
who is really in charge. On the one hand students "learn to
think for themselves." On the other hand there is some un-
identified adult hanging around culling the necessarily finite
number of ideas that will be thought about. l'hough his Full
commission is never made clear, this adult stranger at least is
expected to "exclude parental political views from school.""
We may not know who is running the place, but we know
who is not.
To put it delicately, these are questions here about the
commitment to an ideal of liberty. Quite apart from the obvi-
ous paradox of compelling autonomy, there is an initial ques-
tion of politics. A strategy of delivering even secondary edu-
cation into the hands of a "liberal" elite strikes me as simply
53. Id. at 159.
54. Id. at 163.
55. Id. at 166 n. 10.
56. Burt, supra note 51, at 124.
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beyond the practical reach of democratic society - at least
this one. It is worth remembering, as a starter, that no such
educational regime presently operates in public education,
nor has it. The notion that the public school is value neutral
is illusion, as has been observed by everyone from John
Dewey to the present Supreme Court.5 Nor do I take pro-
tagonists such as Burt and Ackerman to assert the contrary;
what they are expressing is a longing for an ideal yet untried.
By what stages could such an ideal become a general pol-
icy? It would first require frustration of the curriculum pref-
erences of thousands of local majorities. A heroic legislature
must begin by declaring the state's general commitment to a
principle of value neutrality. This alone would require a po-
litical miracle. A second and greater one would be necessary
to make this broad policy operational by enacting detailed
legislation regulating instruction throughout the entire sys-
tem. Even though there is no agreement among educators on
proper content or method, very particular rules would have
to be specified for both. Given the risk that some non-neutral
teacher down the line would empathize with the poor or con-
demn the secret sins of George Washington, little could be
left to chance. Such a reform seems unlikely in a majoritarian
polity. Indeed, its nearest - if remote - approximation is a
creature not of politics but of privatism. It is, curiously, the
"independent" academy of the wealthy that is freest to aspire
to a neutral curriculum. The last place that will ban Kurt
Vonnegut or revive McGuffey is Phillips Andover.
This is not a suggestion that private academies produce
autonomous adults - or that they don't. Indeed, whether
teaching of a "neutral" sort is effective to that end might be
our next question. It may be that a fully socratic secondary
education is ideal, but there is little beyond intuition and rep-
utation to suggest it. Plausibly the opposite could be the case.
The most promising education for autonomy may be a "nar-
57. See e.g. J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 26 (1916); N. ED-
WARDS AND H. RICHEY, THE SCHOOL IN THE AMERICAN SOCIAL ORDER 524-575
(2d ed. 1963), J. TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND (1977). And see M.
Yudof, When Governments Speak. Toward a Theory of Government Expression
and the First Amendment 57 TExAS L. R. 863 (1979) at 878 where the author
argues, in what seems a non sequitur, that "It is precisely because public
school teachers are charged with instilling values to a captive audience that
the protections of academic freedom should be extended to them . .."
For a good insight into the attitude of the current Supreme Court see any
of the seven opinions in Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School
Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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row" one driven by some distinctive ideology. The most lib-
erated adult could turn out to be one who, throughout his
school life, has experienced the steady and uncompromising
faith of his fathers - religious or secular. If, as many educa-
tors contend, the media - especially television - impose
upon children a shallow and marasmic ethic, a case is thereby
suggested for a rather more pointed counter-education in
school as a source of moral liberty. A strong value position
defended by intelligent and committed adults could prove an
exhilarating and toughening experience for a young person
weaned on Fred Flintstone; it might do more for the possibil-
ity and practice of liberty than even a prolonged immersion
in socratic dialogue.
Neutral education is, therefore, both unlikely politically
and problematic as an efficient instrument for producing au-
tonomous adults. But we must add a third concern, one with
which we might well have begun: There is no consensus con-
cerning even the model for autonomy. Who is it that is sup-
posed to represent this peculiar quality? If it is an adult with a
penchant for seeing all sides of an issue, autonomy is essen-
tially some attitude of mind - a virtuous intellectual habit.
But autonomy may instead be seen as a matter of will and
character - specifically the ability to stand against a major-
ity. If so, we may be describing rather different people. My
experience tells me that law professors are a fair example of
people who can perceive and enjoy diversity of thought and
may even "think for themselves." If this be autonomy, they
generally have it. But I know of nothing suggesting that law
professors are especially good (or bad) at standing tall in a
moral crisis. It could be one thing to think for yourself and
another to act upon that knowledge with independence. Does
the ivory tower intellectual qualify while Good Soldier
Schweik fails the test?
No doubt this particular distinction oversimplifies, but it
suggests how unhelpful it can be to see the "root values of
the first amendment" as consisting of something called toler-
ance and diversity of thought and then to imply their close
association with a model of character called individual auton-
omy. In fact the relation of autonomy to tolerance is murky
partly because the meaning of tolerance is also opaque.
Sometimes tolerance suggests a practical disengagement from
moral issues in civic life; once we decide with Dworkin or
Ackerman that no one has "the right to declare that one con-
ception of the good is better than another," it is a little hard
to justify enthusiasm about reforming anything or even to
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imagine what reform might mean. Of course in practice not
all who espouse tolerance lack moral fervor; at least they are
able to summon and express indignation against the intoler-
ant, as by suggesting a lock-out of parental ideas.
In the end the ambiguity about who is intolerant - the
parents or the professors - seems unfathomable. And this is
but one example of the perplexity concerning tolerance and
autonomy that is so richly displayed in the recent political de-
bates over church and state, abortion, gay liberation, school
integration and so forth. But all this ambiguity leaves us won-
dering: In a state of ideological warfare, who is entitled to
the prize for autonomy? If there is a scale for being liberated,
how do we rate Phyllis Schlafly, Mario Cuomo, the Yoders,
James Watt, and Linda Lovelace? Where on the scale should
we put the eccentric who physically attacks abortion clinics?
What about the Rajneesh, The Happy Hooker or The Moral
Majority? Who is liberated?
As I have offered no crisp definition, neither shall I
throw the first stone. I am content that the examples of pa-
rental and child liberty used in this essay are relationships de-
fined by law - rights, duties and powers of children, parents
and the state. It is possible to speak clearly of liberty in juridi-
cal terms. Once we move beyond this to the protean moral
models of autonomy, anything goes - hence it goes badly.
Liberty, self-determination and autonomy continue to emote
long after they have ceased to denote.
My sense is that the legend of the neutral school is really
in the last analysis not about liberty at all. It borrows heavily
from the idiom of liberty for the sound political reason that
in this culture liberty is a rich source of value energy. But the
legend is really an ark of the nineteenth century covenant
concerning schools. Earlier in this essay with some strain I
was able to give liberty a temporary and uneasy place within
that covenant. But at heart this historic compact concerned
the rather different enterprise of capturing from the family
whatever was necessary to insure that its barbarisms would
become tempered by Yankee and professional virtue. The
neutrality legend is best understood as a part of the nativist
folklore that saw hope for American in the deliverance of im-
migrant children from certain ideological and religious bag-
gage. This has never been said more plainly than by those
who promoted the Oregon initiative that went down in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters:
We must now halt those coming to our country from
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forming groups, establishing schools, and thereby bringing
up their children in an environment often antagonistic to
the principles of our government.
Mix the children of the foreign born with the native
born, and the rich with the poor. Mix those with prejudices
in the public school melting pot for a few years while their
minds are plastic, and finally bring out the finished product
a true American.
The permanency of this nation rests in the education
of its youth in our public schools, where they will be cor-
rectly instructed in the history of our country an the aims
of our government, and in those fundamental principles of
freedom and democracy, upon one common level."
The deliverance of the child from the family that was in-
tended by Oregon would have spared us the discrimination
between rich and poor by delivering all children without dis-
tinction to the state. This idea remains as plausible today as it
was in 1920-or for that matter in fifth century Athens. 9
But it is not an idea that should detain us here, for its con-
nection to liberty is at best remote and problematic. Its real
object is the building of culture and community by a particu-
lar coercive social instrument. I think its claim for that instru-
ment is profoundly important as well as profoundly wrong;"
but, much more important, it is irrelevant.
B. Enter the Justices
In modern times the United States Supreme Court has
had occasional encounters with the question of intellectual
liberty in the schools. Since 1923 the justices have produced
a sprinkling of endorsements for the limited autonomy of
parents and their school children, some of which are relevant
here. For all but the most recent of these decisions, 1 it will
serve to note the holding and pass on. These cases are famil-
iar even to laymen, and my sole object is to suggest their lim-
ited scope:
58. Argument (Affirmative) on Official Ballot for Initiative to Amend
Section 5259 Oregon Laws, reprinted in OREGON SCHOOL CASES: COMPLETE
RECORD (Belvedere Press, 1925) pp. 732-4. THE OREGON SCHOOL FIGHT 7
(1925).
59. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (trans. B. Jowett 1946).
60. As argued at length in J. COONS AND S. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY
CHOICE (1978).
61. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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1. Meyer v. Nebraska (1923): 62 A private school teacher
may not be forbidden to teach foreign language.
2. Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925): 63 The state may not
forbid satisfaction of the duty of compulsory educa-
tion in private schools; these schools may be regu-
lated to a degree uncertain.
3. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
(1943):" Public school students with ideological ob-
jections cannot be forced to violate their con-
sciences by reciting the Pledge.
4. Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972):" Students with specific
religious qualifications (namely Amish) may be ex-
cused from a small part of the compulsory educa-
tion laws where suitable alternatives are arranged.
5. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District
(1969)." Students in high school may not be disci-
plined for wearing controversial political symbols
so long as they are not the occasion of serious
disruption.
There are other decisions that plausibly deal with intel-
lectual liberty and might pretend to a place here. The issue
of the rights of public school teachers to introduce or to ex-
clude specific ideas provides an example. In Epperson v. Ar-
kansas"7 the Supreme Court was presented with a replay of
the classic "Monkey Trial." Even in the 1960's Arkansas still
forbade teachers to present the theory of scientific evolution.
The Court rescued the teacher. But teacher liberty is neither
logically nor even practically connected with student liberty
in any system in which the students are not free to seek an-
other teacher. "Academic freedom" is irrelevant to the au-
tonomy of those for whom the system presumably exists. It is
at least as vexing to be tyrannized by an individual as by a
school board. Racial segregation and discrimination cases are
irrelevant for the same reason; the right vindicated has had
nothing to do with student or parental choice. Indeed, the
locus of liberty in the race cases is, if anywhere, in the federal
court.
There is not a great deal that can be said about the con-
62. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
63. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
64. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
65. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
66. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
67. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
[Vol. I
INTELLECTUAL LIBERTY
tribution to liberty even of the few cases noted. Plausibly
Meyer and Pierce should not be considered with the rest. They
are confined to private education. To the degree that they
escape "reasonable regulation" private schools may be a
source of liberty for those whose preferences they happen tQ
represent and who can afford their tuition. But the "Pierce
Compromise" does nothing at all for the bulk of families who
perforce use public schools, and they are the concern and jus-
tification for this essay.
Barnette and Tinker, of course, are wholly relevant. Each
represents a pure species of intellectual liberty - the former
the right to forgo expression demanded by the school; the
latter the right to engage in a certain kind of expression for-
bidden by the school. Yoder too represents a limited escape
for particular nonconformists; and I should also concede that
the exclusion of compulsory prayer from public schools is yet
another example of liberty for at least some." Aside from
the effect of Pierce, however, the strongest single impression
from these cases is that of triviality. There is much less here
than meets the eye, and the confirmation of this is the
Court's 1981 decision in Board of Education, Island Trees
Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico.19 It is to date the most
florid example of devotion to the symbols of intellectual lib-
erty and, simultaneously, to the servile reality of school. The
Court pledges its allegiance to student liberty while endorsing
crude intellectual coercion. The decision deserves special
attention.
Pico involved a school board that had brusquely and awk-
wardly interfered with the administration of its high school
library to remove a few volumes which (for reasons that were
in dispute) fell out of favor with a board majority. Certain
students sought an injunction. The Supreme Court produced
seven opinions, the only result being that the case was sent
back for trial (and ultimately settled). It may be inferred from
all the opinions that a school board's power to remove books
is not unbounded, but the substantive and procedural limits
of its authority over the whole of the education process re-
main few and obscure. In the opinion announcing the Court's
judgment, Justice Brennan, speaking for only three members
of the Court, asserted a new student liberty right to receive
68. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. of Abing-
ton Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
69. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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information;70 this sounds important, but his opinion, to be
fair, is not only cryptic but inconsequential. The case has
been ably analyzed elsewhere, 1 and my interest is limited to
the curious light it shed on the liberty thesis.
I said that Pico endorses crude intellectual coercion. By
this I mean that, even the justices who voted to send the case
back for trial, went out of their way to emphasize that school
boards have wide authority to impose their preferred forms
of intellectual experience upon students. This is said of the
library selection process, but more importantly it is said of
the curriculum. Indeed, here the board is acknowledged to
have a very broad discretion. Given this concession of essen-
tial school supremacy, there appears to be something para-
doxical in the Brennan encomium to student liberty. In
truth, however, this incongruity is required by the Court si-
multaneous commitment to the existing structure and to the
argot of liberty. It cannot bear to surrender its claims as the
champion of speech, but it is unshakeably loyal to the coer-
cive system. The Court cannot afford to utter an intelligible
rationale based in liberty, for it would be reduced to speaking
in contradictions. Who cannot be sympathetic to its plight?
Facing this dilemma, the justices wisely chose to obfus-
cate the problem. Happily the case came up focussed upon
the voluntary use of the library collection; this made the
Court's escape from the basic issue relatively easy. The jus-
tices could distinguish and isolate the embarrassing implica-
tions of a compulsory curriculum. That they did so is under-
standable. Unlike the library, the curriculum is in every
dimension a form of intellectual constraint; it is the full mea-
sure of the "inculcative" system operating in its most typical
mode.72 It is what children actually experience on a daily
basis.
This is not a suggestion that compulsory education or
70. Id. at 866-67.
71. For detailed analysis see, Note, "The Supreme Court, 1981
Term," 96 HAv. L. REV. 62, 151-160 (1982).
72. In a narrower context Professor Tribe has described such intel-
lectual regimen as -[T]he special place of public schools in American life.
Nothing could be more expressive of our society's commitment to a partic-
ular. . . practice than our willingness to use, as a forum for that [practice],
the facilities through which basic norms are transmitted to our young." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTruTIONAL LAW 825 (1978). Before I inserted the
dots and the bracket in this quotation it included the words "religious" and
"religion". On reflection these words only emphasize the parallel between
teaching sectarian dogma and whatever it is the public schools now do.
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minimum standards violate liberty. These devices need be no
more authoritarian in effect than rules against child abuse;
they can protect the child by assuring an intellectual safety
net. They Could be viewed as a part of the very structure of
liberty. What could not be justified as liberty is the conscrip-
tion of a child to attend a particular public school, when the
child and/or his parents would prefer another school - pub-
lic or private - which would satisfy the state-determined
minimum standard.
Suppose the next plaintiffs object straightforwardly to
ideas odious to them that they are forced to study in class or
complain about the exclusion from their classes of ideas that
they wish to study. Justice Brennan has assured them that, in
the library they have a "right to receive information." Re-
garding curriculum, however, he is prepared to frustrate this
same right in order to protect professional control. Obviously
there is a liberty interest in the child's having access in class
to the ideas he and/or his parents want learned. How can
Brennan's distinction be defended on liberty grounds?
The reality is that once the existing framework of coer-
cion is accepted as legitimate, no judicial remedy can satisfy
the liberty interest. This would remain so even if (or espe-
cially if) the judges themselves decided what should be stud-
ied s.7 No judicial order could promote liberty of the child,
unless it secured to the representative of that liberty the ca-
pacity to secure the education of his choice. The autonomy
principle cannot by its nature be honored under the present
regime of compulsory attendance at a school chosen and run
by strangers.
Even in the limited library setting of Pico the inevitability
of intellectual conscription forced the justices into grotesque
positions. Brennan, for example, would authorize judicial in-
tervention only within the zone of "voluntary" student in-
quiry which he asserted is typical of a library and untypical of
the classroom. There is, to be sure a distinction here, though
the pervasive fact of compulsory attendance saps much of its
force. But, even accepting Brennan's point, the overall effect
is peculiar, and the protective force of the new right is incon-
spicuous. For the constitutional guarantee then becomes ef-
fective only when it is least needed; indeed, the particular 1i-
73. Professor Van Geel would apparently approve such a solution.
See T. Van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Author-
ity to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEx. L. R. 197 (1983).
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brary books could have been procured elsewhere, while
liberty in the classroom - for most families - could not.
Brennan declines to rescue student choice exactly where it is
most beset. When a curriculum case eventually arises, will the
court relent, go further and recognize a student right to re-
ceive (or avoid) particular communications in class? I think
certainly not, for such a protection would cripple the very
system of intellectual constraint which the Court accepts as a
given.
There are other peculiarities about the Brennan opinion
that betray an acceptance of systematic coercion. It specifi-
cally recognizes that, in spite of the liberty interest, govern-
ment may require student attention to very particular ideas
(presumably excluding others) because of the school board's
"duty to inculcate community values.""' Now that duty in
most states is only statutory. How it could outweigh the stu-
dent's First Amendment liberty right is puzzling. Is the stat-
ute conceived to justify itself? In other First Amendment set-
tings the government has been required to demonstrate both
a compelling interest of its own and the absence of any alter-
native solution less onerous to the enjoyment of the pro-
tected interest.7 Why not here? It could scarcely be a com-
pelling interest of the state that families not exercise their
First Amendment rights.
The Brennan opinion would test the board's power to
remove books by examining its motivation. The rights of the
students turn on whether the board had its hearts in the
right places. How is this to be determined? On the one hand,
say the justices, a board can properly wish to inculcate funda-
mental values and community aspirations, and it may pro-
mote " 'respect for authority and traditional values be they
social moral or political' .76 On the one hand it cannot aim
to suppress ideas or to prescribe the " 'orthodox in politics,
nationalism. . . or other matters of opinion.' ,77 Much has
been said about what this collection of phrases might mean. I
will say nothing, for I do not understand it. It seems a wholly
elastic notion by which any result will be possible in almost
any case. Nor do I grasp still another distinction proposed
between censorship in ordering books and censorship in their
74. 457 U.S. at 869.
75. See e.g. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
76. 457 U.S. at 864, quoting Brief for Petitioners 10.
77. Id. at 872, quoting West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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removal, 78 except perhaps as a pragmatic perception that mo-
tivation may be easier to prove in the latter case, thereby eas-
ing the Court's task. What can be said with conviction, is that
all such niggling and marginal distinctions are precisely what
could be expected in an arena where candor would be a
hero's (or a fool's) calling and in which the Court cannot af-
ford to get serious about the very liberty interest it proclaims.
The plurality opinion in Pico is a distracting liberal gesture;
nothing more.
I should not leave the impression that the Brennan opin-
ion is the only puzzle in the case. The concurring opinions
and dissents seem equally bewildered by the effort to square
the First Amendment with the structure of the school system.
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, for example, thinks it useful to
distinguish government acting as sovereign from government
acting as educator.7 9 The implication may be (it is impossible
to tell) that government's role as educator is less a threat to
First Amendment values. School is a consistently benign insti-
tution; it is not the military draft or a code of television cen-
sorship. Rehnquist would have it that government acting as
schoolmaster is much like government acting as a private
property owner; it is free on its own property to do what it
could not do elsewhere. He views the system as if the pupils
come by choice as willing customers. There is here no per-
ception that the process require the incarceration of persons
without consent in order to carry out the "inculcation" that
is given judicial blessing."" To Justice Rehnquist public
school is a tame and virtually private concern of the owner of
some buildings that he happens to use as schools.
What is it to act as "sovereign?" Public school is the pri-
mary social instrument for the most comprehensive nonpenal
system of compulsion known to our society, not excluding the
military. School is the lever of intellectual control, the tool of
a conscious collective effort to induce citizens to think correct
thoughts. This may be good, bad or indifferent; but this is
sovereign, or nothing is sovereign. If, the school board, nev-
ertheless, enjoys a special exemption from the First Amend-
ment, this can be only because the interests of such a system
precede in constitutional dignity the liberty right of parent
and child.
The school system and the declared student right cannot
78. Id. at 862.
79. Id. at 920.
80. Id. at 914.
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peacefully coexist; the government's "special role as educa-
tor" in its present structure requires that it act as selector,
inculcator, and indoctrinator - in short as a restrainer of
intellectual liberty. Nor can euphemisms about neutrality al-
ter the reality that teaching involves the transmission of spe-
cific values. The only question is who shall get to choose and
impose them. Still, I concede that all this may be virtually
invisible to persons of the age and peculiar experience of the
justices. Perhaps their own families have for the most part
been able to choose where to live and where to send the chil-
dren. They could be forgiven for imagining that the public
schools are part of a system of liberty enjoyed even by the
nonrich, because they have never been challenged to con-
sider any other possibility. And they have missed the reality.
But in any case little can be expected of the Court. The
justices cannot protect the liberty interest of child and parent
unless they have the temerity to condemn the system itself.
Short of that they are reduced to the role of occasional
sniper. The Court can gesture at the margin rescuing a few
books for the library; it can provide some procedural harass-
ment on behalf of students in trouble;81 it can approve their
nondisruptive badges and pins.83 Meanwhile, however, it will
reassure the system by authorizing batteries by teachers upon
their pupils - batteries that might violate the rights of a
convicted rapist.83 (Are even prisons more libertarian?) In-
deed, under the Constitution the school may and does beat
children even in the face of parental objection to corporal
punishment.' And what it may visit upon the body as an ex-
ceptional matter it may visit upon the mind in the regular
course of school business.
Even if the Court were inclined to heroics, there is little
it could do to insinuate fundamental First Amendment values
81. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975).
82. 78 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
83. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
84. Id. And see New Jersey v. T.L.O., __ U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 733
(1985). Note should also be taken of the rash of cases that reached the
federal Courts of Appeal involving such relevant matters as hair length and
student newspapers. These are collected in D. KRP AND M. YUDOF, EDUCA-
TIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW, (2d ed 1982), at 168-172, 187-193, 201-206,
21-218. The excitement over these issues appears to be spent, the old prac-
tices are unabated, and " . . . remarkably little judicial intervention has
actually occurred." Kirp, Pupil Control: How Innocents Get Caught in the
Classroom Dragnet, TIMES EDUCATIONAL Supp., August 10, 1984.
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into public education. So long as the system retains the capac-
ity to force the average family into state institutions, the
court is basically helpless. Theory may suggest that, in some
activist season, the justices could embark upon a course of
institutional restructuring. Arguments are sometimes made
that the First Amendment excuses all dissenters from the
public school regime. Fair enough; perhaps there are adum-
brations of such a liberty in Barnette. 5 But how then does the
child get educated, if the family cannot afford tuition? Is the
Court prepared to find a complementary 14th Amendment
right to a subsidy the parents can spend in a school of their
choice?" It may move that way. But not much and not soon.
CONCLUSION
Will the education of children remain inevitably an ex-
ception to a general commitment to individual autonomy?
Perhaps not. The present reality may be politically contin-
gent. For only a few generations has the system served the set
of interlocking political and economic interests that so con-
flict with the liberty of parents and children. If these interests
are beyond the court's reach, they are not necessarily beyond
that of politics. It now is plausible that half the population
would desert public schools (as presently operated) were it
not for economic compulsion. 7 And it is by no means certain
that public school teachers are satisfied with their own or the
85. West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
86. See S. ARONS, COMPELLING BEuEF, supra note 2; See also Arons,
The Separation of School and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HARv. E. R. (1976);
Arons and Lawrence, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First Amendment
Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 309
(1980). And see generally B.M. YuDoF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SP_.EAS (1983).
The appearance of Arons' sustained argument and Yudof's balanced and
objective treatise is earnest of an academic interest in the problem that
cannot fail to alter the perception of the next generation.
87. A 1982 survey suggests that forty-five percent of public school
families would leave if it were not for economic compulsion, Gallup Poll of
the Public Attitude toward the Public Schools PHi DELTA KAPPAN (September
1982), p. 37, 47. Here are the precise question and responses:
Suppose you could send your eldest child to a private school, tui-
tion free. Which would you prefer-to send him or her to a pri-
vate school or to a public school?
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Why do you say that?
Public School
Reasons for preferring Parents
private school %
Higher standard of education 28
Better discipline 27
More individual attention 21
Smaller class size 17
Better curriculum 12
Quality of teachers 11
Religious/moral reasons 5
Parents have more input 3
Miscellaneous 10
Don't know I
(Figures add to more than 100% because of multiple answers.)
If the 45% who would leave public schools were added to the 10% of the
total population already in private schools, it seems plausible that half or
more of the electorate might support a system of family choice. This likeli-
hood would increase if the proposal included the opportunity for the pub-
lic sector itself to adopt the flexibility and choice characteristic of private
schools. On the other hand political predictions from such polls are notori-
ously unreliable.
The 1983 edition of the same poll asked the "voucher" question in a
much more direct form. That form and the results are reported in PHi
DELTA KAPPAN, September, 1983, p. 38; as follows:
In some nations, the government allots a certain amount of
money for each child for his or her education. The parents can
then send the child to any public, parochial, or private school they
choose. This is called the "voucher system." Would you like to see
such an idea adopted in this country?
(Vol. I
INTELLECTUAL LIBERTY
public's perception of their place in our culture." The role
of monopolist is a source of regret to many in the profession
and not merely for the limits it places on economic reward. If
the mythology of intellectual liberty begins to erode, recon-
ciliation of schooling with a constitutional ideal of autonomy
could be politically imaginable.
Number Public Nonpublic
National Children School School
Totals in School Parents Parents
Favor voucher system 51 51 48 64
Oppose voucher system 38 37 41 30
No opinion 11 12 11 6
NATIONAL TOTALS Favor Oppose No Opinion
1970 survey 43 46 11
1971 survey 38 44 18
1981 survey 43 41 16
1983 survey 51 38 11
88. Fewer than 25 percent of teachers now feel they made the right
professional choice. J. NATHAN, FREE TO TEACH 59 (1983). The recent Car-
negie Report suggests that teacher salaries represent 37.6 percent of the
cost of K-12 public education. E. FEsmrrzER, THE CONDmON OF T ACHING
55 supra note 45. If the conventional wisdom (and my own experience) is
correct, this is scarcely more than half the percentage consumed by salaries
in private schools. The private experience suggests strong customer prefer-
ence for. investment in teachers over alternative services. Assuming that
alternative costs (administration, special services, etc.) are necessarily
higher in the public sector as now organized, it would seem in the self-
interest of teachers to begin to move public schools as far as possible to-
ward the more modestly regulated private model. But see J. Chambers,
Patterns of Compensation of Public and Private School Teachers, Project Report
No. 84-A18, Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Govern-
ment (Stanford, 1984).
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